Adding that much manpower to Moscow’s primary objective of “liberating” the Russian-speaking population in the Donbas made sense. This is the one good move Russia made in the first nine months of war. Instead, Putin took the public relations hit and ordered his entire northern force to withdraw and join the axes that had attacked in the Donbas.

Russia did not have anywhere near the number of troops necessary to control any city of more than 1 million people. The prideful thing to do - and many armies fall victim to decisions based on pride - was to stay and reinforce their positions, sticking to the original plan to take one or more of the cities.

From a strategic point of view, however, the move had value for the Kremlin. Having been blunted by what Russia considered an inferior force, upward of 40,000 Russian troops abandoned the whole of the northern front.

On the surface, this looked like an unqualified failure. Putin chose the latter, and this was Russia’s first good move. It could either significantly reinforce around the three major urban centers in the north, or withdraw its forces from there. At this moment, Moscow faced a stark choice. Ukrainian forces had recovered from their initial shock and deployed large formations that attacked Russian armor with anti-tank guided missiles from the west, to great effect. Putin’s army at that time was positioned on three sides of Kyiv and to the north of Sumy and Kharkiv, spread over a distance of nearly 500 kilometers. By the middle of March 2022 it was clear that Russia had penetrated as far into Ukraine as it was going to get - far short of its initial objectives. This analysis picks up in the aftermath of Russia’s first major error, the splitting of its forces into four relatively small axes that allowed Ukraine to slow and then stop all four drives. The analysis that follows will detail Russia’s opening moves, which include “the bad” we have seen from the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

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